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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
But in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The certainty of both death and taxes remains as true today as
when Benjamin Franklin remarked upon them in 1789. A change
has occurred, however, in the way in which individuals and the
medical and legal professions perceive death.
Advancements in medical technology have enabled the medical
profession to extend and sustain life far beyond the boundaries of
what was previously thought possible. The consequences of these
advancements have raised novel problems which have been only par-
tially resolved. The ability to transplant organs initiated some of the
first problems faced by the medical and legal professions. The prob-
ability of success in the organ transplant was increased if the organ
was infused with oxygen; but under the traditional definition of
death, the cessation of respiration and pulsation,2 a person whose
respiration and circulation were maintained by artificial means was
alive regardless of the loss of cognitive functions. Physicians faced
the possibility of civil liability for wrongful death or criminal liability
for homicide for the "death" of the donor body. They were "forced
to work not only at the edge of medical knowledge but also at the
edge of the law. ' 3 This problem was resolved by nationwide ac-
ceptance of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 19684 and by a
change in the definition of death itself.
A problem still in the process of being resolved involves the right
of individuals to control their own fate in the context of medical
, Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste LeRoy (Nov. 13, 1789), reprinted in THE
OXFORD DICTiONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 211:9 (2d ed. 1953).
2 BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 488 (4th ed. 1968); Known as the "heart-lung" definition of death,
D. MEYERs, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYNlO, § 3.1 at 17 (1981); [hereinafter cited
as Death and Dying].
I Sideman & Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Donations from Cadavers, 21 SYRAcusE L.
REV. 825, 828 (1969-70).
4 DEATH AND DYING, supra note 2, § 17.10 at 529.
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advances by refusing all forms of medical treatment, even to the
point of death. This has come to be popularly tagged as the "right
to die with dignity" unencumbered by intrusive and unwanted in-
tervention. This article will survey the common law, constitutional,
and statutory bases of an individual's "right to die with dignity"
and the cases discussing the extent of an individual's right to do
so, including the refusal or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.
The definition of death has evolved within the last twenty years.
Thus, it is important to gain a preliminary understanding of the
present legal and medical definitions of death.
II. THE DEFINITION OF DEATH
A. The Traditional Definition
The "heart-lung" definition of death was expressed by Black's
Law Dictionary as "[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; de-
fined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood, and a cessation... thereon, such as respiration, pulsation,
etc." 5 In short, when an individual no longer breathed and there
was no heart beat, the person was dead. This led to strained results,
as evidenced by a 1952 Kentucky case in vhich a decapitated woman
was said to have survived her husband "for a fleeting moment"
because blood was gushing from her neck.6 The limitations inherent
in the definition, in light of medical advances and the possible li-
ability connected with organ transplantation, provided the catalyst
for a new legal definition of when life ceased-brain death.
B. Brain Death
The uniformly accepted definition of brain death, judicially and
legislatively, is total cessation of all brain functions, including func-
tions of the brain stem.7
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).
6 Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
DEATH AND DyiNG, supra note 2, § 4.3 at 27 (citing BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY); Lovato v.
District Court In And For The Tenth Judicial Dist., 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1979).
[Vol. 90
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Some jurisdictions have judicially adopted the brain death stand-
ard, usually in connection with criminal cases. A representative ex-
ample is an Arizona court's decision rejecting a criminal defendant's
contention that termination of life support systems caused the vic-
tim's death rather than five gunshot wounds.' The court recognized
that under the traditional definition, the victim was not dead when
the life support systems were removed because "the body of the
victim was breathing, though not spontaneously, and blood was pul-
sating through his body. . ."9 The Arizona court found, however,
that the gunshot wounds were the proximate cause of death and
that the victim "was legally dead before the life support systems
were withdrawn." 10 The court concluded that brain death, "if prop-
erly supported by expert medical testimony, is ... a valid test for
death in Arizona," reasoning that the physicians "passively stepp[ed]
aside to let the natural course of events lead from brain death to
common law death.""1
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted a
statutory definition of brain death. Twenty-five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia provide a choice between the "heart-lung" def-
inition or the brain death definition.12 Eight states allow use of the
4 State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 184, 603 P.2d 74, 76 (1979).
Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
10 Id.
" Id. at 186, 603 P.2d at 78.
12 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering Supp. 1987); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-2401 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1986); ItN. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (Burns 1986);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALT-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202(a) (Supp.
1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1986); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 451.007 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1984);
Omno REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Anderson Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (Vest
Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1985); PA. STAT. Am. tit. 35, § 10201 (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 5218 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.7 (1986 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.71 (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1986). The definitional sections for death
in the Connecticut and North Carolina statutes, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-278(b) (West 1986)
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1985), allow both definitions to be used but also contain elements
of the second category of definitions. An example of this category is Maryland's statute: Cessation
of circulatory and respiratory or brain functions.
(a) Determination of death. - An individual is dead if, based on ordinary standards of
1987]
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brain death definition when cessation of respiration and circulation
cannot be determined because of artificial maintenance of these
functions. 13 Two states statutorily define death using only the brain
death standard, with no mention of the traditional "heart-lung"
definition.
14
One factor shared by all adoptions of the brain death definition
is the traditional interplay of the medical and legal professions. The
medical profession establishes the criteria for death, but the actual
definition of death is legally determined, either judicially or sta-
tutorily.
C. The Usefulness and Limitations of the Brain Death
Definition
The definition of death as cessation of brain functions has solved
some of the problems originally faced by the medical and legal
professions. There is now no doubt that the cause of death in a
criminal case is the criminal act and not the removal of artificial
medical practice, the individual has sustained either:
(1) Irreversible cesssation of circulatory and respiratory functions; or
(2) Irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.
MD. H aL-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (Supp. 1986).
11 ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.085 (West 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 327C-1 (1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West
Supp. 1987); MIcH. STAT. Am. § 14.15 (1021) (Callaghan Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005
(Vernon 1987); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1987). An example of this
category is Michigan's statute:
Determination of death; means; time of death.
Sec. 1. A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice in the community, there is the irreversible cessation
of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. If artificial means of support preclude
a determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in
the announced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice in
the community, there is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death
will have occured at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (1021) (Callaghan Supp. 1987).
4 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 302 (Smith Hurd 1978); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985).
An example of this category is West Virginia's statute:
Brain Death
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of
all functioning of the brain is dead. A determination under this section must be made in
accordance with reasonable medical standards.
W. VA. CODE § 10-16-2 (1985). 4
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support systems from a brain dead victim. Physicians can now trans-
plant organs from legally dead persons whose respiratory and cir-
culatory functions are maintained by artificial means without fear
of liability. The brain death definition does not, however, address
the problem of the individual who has suffered partial brain death.
Three frequent causes of partial brain death include traumatic
injuries to the head, spontaneous brain hemorrhages, and depri-
vation of oxygenated blood flow to the brain.' 5 The brain dies in
stages when deprived of oxygen. Deprivation for a period of four
to six minutes is sufficient to cause irreversible loss of function to
the cerebral cortex, the portion of the brain which controls the proc-
esses of thought, emotion, and consciousness. Deprivation of oxygen
for ten to twenty minutes will result in death of the brain stem, the
more primitive portion of the brain which controls respiration, heart
rate, and blood pressure. While the cortex may suffer irreversible
loss of function after four to six minutes of oxygen deprivation, the
brain stem may remain unaffected.' 6 "[A] patient may well be ren-
dered unconscious, and incapable of recovering consciousness, and
any capacity for thought, emotion, and intellectual perception, but
may have the ability to spontaneously breathe and maintain pulse
and circulation.' 7 Thus, other judicial applications and statutory
measures have been necessary to respond to the problems resulting
when an individual or a representative of an incompetent individual
exercises the right to refuse medical treatment in this situation and
in others akin to it.
III. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The right to refuse medical treatment or intervention has three
legal bases: common law, constitutional, and statutory. The inter-
play of these three bases provides the foundation from which in-
dividuals or their representatives have exercised the "right to die
with dignity."
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A. The Common Law Basis
The right of an individual to bodily integrity is well-established
in the common law. The United States Supreme Court recognized
this established principle in 1891. A plaintiff in a personal injury
action refused to submit to the medical examination requested by
the defendants, and the court held in conclusive terms that she had
the right to refuse. "No right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law."' 8
Common law held medical treatment to be an invasion of bodily
integrity that required the consent of the patient. Judge Cardozo
succinctly stated this principle in 1914. "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages."' 19 Under the doctrine of informed consent, the phy-
sician is required to give sufficient information to the patient so that
he understands his condition, prognosis, and the risks and benefits
of alternatives, including no treatment. The patient must be capable
of voluntarily making a reasoned judgment regarding alternative
treatments or no treatment.20 The corollary of informed consent is
the right to refuse any medical treatment whatsoever.
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination.
It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he
may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving
surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation
or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him
to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice
or deception.
21
Although the common law is a strong and viable basis for the right
to refuse medical treatment, the first court to squarely face the prob-
11 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
19 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985).
21 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-7, 350 P.2d 1092, 1104 (1960).
[Vol. 90
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lem of the termination of treatment of a mechanically maintained
individual decided the question on constitutional grounds.
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
Karen Ann Quinlan had been in a coma and her breathing had
been maintained by a respirator for approximately one year when
her father, Joseph Quinlan, petitioned the New Jersey court for
appointment as her guardian with express power to terminate the
extraordinary medical procedures sustaining her vital functions. 22 Jo-
seph Quinlan relied upon the following three claimed constitutional
rights to exercise this power: an independent parental right to ex-
ercise freedom of religion, protection against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, and the right of privacy. 23 The court refused to recognize
an "independent parental right of religious freedom to support the
relief requested" and also termed the situation religious neutral, rais-
ing no constitutional religious question. 24 The Constitution's eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment was
also held inapplicable in this case because it applied only to penal
sanctions or punishment inflicted by state or law. 25 The assertion of
Karen's constitutional right of privacy, however, was accepted by
the court.2
6
Recognition of the right of privacy has expanded during the same
time period in which technological medical advances have raised
problems connected with death and individual rights. The United
States Supreme Court recognized the existence of the right of privacy
in penumbras of the Bill of Rights in Griswold v. Connecticut in
1965.27 Griswold was concerned with contraception, the intimate re-
lationship between husband and wife, and "the physician's role in
one aspect of that relation. '28 The Court held that such relationships
were "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 35 A.2d 647, 654, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2 Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
Id. at 37, 355 A.2d at 661-62.
25 Id. at 38, 355 A.2d at 662.
Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
21 Id. at 482.
19871
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constitutional guarantees. ' 29 In 1973, the Supreme Court held that
the right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 0 The Court
observed that this penumbral right had possibly been recognized by
the Supreme Court in 1891 in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford3'
and that decisions have extended this right "to activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education." ' 32 The New Jersey court in Quinlan inter-
preted the areas covered by the Supreme Court's privacy decisions
as interdictions of "judicial intrusion into many aspects of personal
decision" and extrapolated from previous decisions an evolutionary
application of the right of privacy to "a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances.' 33 Karen Quinlan,
if competent, could have decided to remove the life support system
"even if it meant the prospect of natural death" and that right was
not destroyed by her incompetency.14
The right of privacy exists, but it is not absolute. 5 Balanced
against the individual's right of privacy are countervailing state in-
terests. Recognized state interests are the preservation and sanctity
of human life, maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession, prevention of suicide, and protection of innocent third
parties. 36 The court used a balancing test in Quinlan to determine
whether the state's interests outweighed the individual's right of pri-
vacy. Setting the standard for future cases, this balancing test em-
ployed such factors as the prognosis, the degree of bodily invasion,
and the possibility of resumption of cognitive life. "[T]he State's
interest . . . weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ul-
9 Id. at 485.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
3I Id. at 152; see supra, text accompanying note 18 (common law right to bodily integrity).
32 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
3 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
34 Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 664.
31 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223; Satz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), approved, 379 So.2d 359 (1980); In
re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 641, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660
P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
[Vol. 90
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timately there comes a point at which the individual's rights over-
come the State interest."
'3 7
The New Jersey court's analysis of the countervailing state's in-
terests also set a standard that proved to be a guidelines for future
cases, particularly on the integrity of the medical profession. Karen
Quinlan's attending physicians were correct in refusing to withdraw
the respirator according "to the then existing medical standards and
practices. '"38 These standards and practices were not, however, an
"ineluctable bar" to granting Joseph Quinlan's petition.3 9 Physicians
differentiate between "curing the ill and comforting and easing the
dying" and "refuse to treat the curable as if they were dying or
ought to die, and . . . they have sometimes refused to treat the
hopeless and dying as if they were curable. ' 40 The court concluded
that "the focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the
reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as dis-
tinguished from the forced continuance of. .. biological vegetative
existence." 4
1
The common law and the constitutional right of privacy provide
powerful support for individuals, competent and incompetent, in the
assertion of their right to control their own bodies and resist un-
wanted bodily invasions. The wide publicity the Quinlan case re-
ceived in 1976 dramatically brought to lay, legal, and legislative
attention the problems inherent with advancing medical technology
and the exercise of individual rights. The legislative response was
enactment of natural death acts.
C. The Natural Death Acts
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted
some form of a natural death act, under various names, allowing
termination of mechanical or artificial life-prolonging measures in
" Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
,S Id. at 45, 355 A.2d at 666.
39 Id.
11 Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
I1 d. at 51. 355 A.2d at 669.
1987]
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certain circumstances. 42 Although the acts are not identical, they are
usually structurally similar. The following four basic provisions are
found in most of the acts: a set of definitions, a procedure for
executing a living will, a procedure for revoking a living will, 43 and
immunity to health care providers. West Virginia's Natural Death
Act" will be employed as a beginning reference in the consideration
of the provisions discussed, with comments on other states' statutes
included for comparison and differing provisions.
1. Definitions
In the majority of state acts, provisions allowing termination of
artificial or mechanical means of treatment under some circum-
stances are limited by statutory definitions. The West Virginia act
defines attending physician, declaration (living will), life-sustaining
procedure, physician, qualified patient, and terminal condition. As
in most natural death acts, the most restrictive definitions are found
for life-sustaining procedure, qualified patient, and terminal con-
dition.
41 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1986); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (Deering Supp. 1987); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to
-113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701 to 710 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1986); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1
to .11 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28.101 to .109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1986);
MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -604 (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to
-121 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-101 to -206 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-
H:1 to :10 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to
-323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050
to .090 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1985); TEX. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp.
1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70,122.010 to .905
(Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West Supp.
1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986).
4" A written declaration directing the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment in specified
circumstances.
" W. VA. CODE § 16-30-1 to -10 (1986).
10
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a. Life-sustaining Procedure
A life-sustaining procedure is "any medical procedure or inter-
vention which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only
to artificially prolong the dying process and where, in the judgment
of the attending physician and a second physician, death will occur
whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized. ' 45 The
restrictions of this definition are obvious. It is not the nature of the
medical procedure which determines whether it is a "life-sustaining
procedure," but rather to whom and in what stage of illness it is
applied, a "qualified patient" engaged in an incurable "dying proc-
ess." This is the essence of most states' definitions of a life-sus-
taining procedure, although the name used may be life support
system, 46 maintenance medical treatment, 47 life-prolonging proce-
dure 4 8 artificial life-prolonging procedure, 49 death-prolonging pro-
cedure, 0 or extraordinary means 1.5  State statutes which do specify
the nature of the procedure usually use wording similar to that in
Florida's Life-Prolonging Procedures Act: 2 "[A]ny medical pro-
cedure, treatment, or intervention which: (a) Utilizes mechanical or
other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a spontaneous
vital function." 53 This is always only a portion of the definition,
the other portion containing the "qualified patient" and "dying
process" restrictions. New Mexico's anomalous statutory definition
of life-sustaining procedure is much broader and, therefore, less re-
strictive. It simply defines "maintenance medical treatment" as
"medical treatment designed solely to sustain the life processes." 5 4
The New Mexico Right to Die Act, however, is anomalous almost
throughout and will be considered later.
" Id. §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1986).
4' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(l) (West Supp. 1987).
4" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501(d) (1983). "[U]tilizes mechanical or other artificial means
to sustain, restore or supplant a vital function ... artificially prolong[ing] the dying process."
41 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986).
4" IDAHO CODE § 39-402(3) (Supp. 1986).
.0 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3)(Vernon 1983).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(2) (1985).
,' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 to .15 (1986).
" Id. § 763.03(3) (1986).
4 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-2(C) (1986).
19871
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West Virginia's definition of life-sustaining procedure further re-
stricts the withdrawal or termination of a life-sustaining procedure
by excluding from the definition "the administration of medication
or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to
provide comfort, care or to alleviate pain." 55 This exclusion of the
administration of medication and procedures to provide comfort,
care and alleviate pain is common, although not universal. Some
acts are more restrictive and also specifically exclude the adminis-
tration of foods or fluids, also called nutrition, sustenance, and
hydration.5 6 West Virginia does not specifically exclude nutrition and
hydration in its definition of life-sustaining procedure. However, the
statutory form of the written declaration to withdraw life-sustaining
procedures (hereinafter referred to as "living will") provides "that
I be permitted to die naturally with only the administration of nu-
trition, medication or the performance of any medical procedure
deemed necessary to provide me with comfort, care or to alleviate
pain."' 57 The statute states that "[t]he declaration shall be substan-
tially" in the form set forth in the Code but "may include other
specific directions not inconsistent with other provisions of this ar-
ticle.""8 This would appear to encompass nutrition within the ex-
clusion from withdrawal of "any medical procedure deemed necessary
to provide comfort, care or to alleviate pain."
Two states specifically include nutrition and hydration in meas-
ures that may be withdrawn or withheld. Tennessee's Right to Nat-
ural Death Act 9 distinguishes between medical treatment to diagnose,
" W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(3) (1985). West Virginia's wording of this exclusion is unique. Every
other statute that has a similar exclusion states "comfort care or to alleviate pain" rather than West
Virginia's statement "comfort, care or to alleviate pain."
,6 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4) (1986); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (Supp. 1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-32-2(5)(A) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(3) (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, para.
702(c) (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND. CODE AN. § 16-8-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1986); IowA CODE ANN, §
144.25 (West Supp. 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(II) (Supp. 1986); OLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 3102(4) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050(3) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-
1103(6)(b) (Supp. 1987); Vis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (WVest Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-
144(iii) (Supp. 1986).
17 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(d) (1985).
Id. (emphasis added).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1985).
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assess, or treat a patient ("medical care") and measures taken pri-
marily for the patient's comfort ("palliative care"). 60 Both may be
withdrawn from a qualified patient,61 and both specifically include
forms of nutrition and hydration. 62 The Alaska Living Will Act 63
provides a choice between provision or withdrawal of nutrition in
its suggested form for a living will.64 Both of these inclusions are
limited by other statutory provisions and definitions of qualified
patient and terminal condition.
b. Qualified Patient
Almost all natural death acts have a definition for a qualified
patient, i.e., one from whom life-sustaining procedures may be with-
held or withdrawn. These definitions usually have only two elements.
The patient must have executed a living will in accordance with the
statute, and the patient must be certified by a statutorily determined
number of physicians to be in a terminal condition. West Virginia
defines a qualified patient as:
'Qualified patient' means a patient who has executed a declaration in accordance
with this article and who has been diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted
with a terminal condition by two physicians who have personally examined the
patient, one of whom is the attending physician: Provided, that if there be more
than one attending physician, all such attending physicians must certify in writing
that the patient is afflicted with a terminal condition. 65
The definitions for qualified patients and life-sustaining procedures
must be read with the definition for terminal condition in order to
understand the entirety of the restrictions on eligibility for the "right
to die" under the natural death acts.
c. Terminal Condition
The terminal condition definition contained in natural death acts
usually has at least four elements: (1) incurable or irreversible con-
Id. § 32-11-103(5) & (6) (Supp. 1985).
0 Id. §§ 32-11-102(a) & 32-11-104(a) (Supp. 1985).
62 Id. §§ 32-11-103(5) & (6) (Supp. 1985).
63 ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100 (1986).
6I Id. § 18.12.010 (1986).
3W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(5) (1985).
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dition; (2) condition caused by injury, disease, or illness; (3) there
is no possibility of recovery, or natural death would result regardless
of the application of life-sustaining procedures; and (4) death is
imminent, would occur within a short period of time, or the moment
of death is merely postponed by the application of life-sustaining
procedures.
West Virginia defines terminal condition as "an incurable con-
dition caused by injury, disease or illness, which, regardless of the
application of life-sustaining procedures, would ... cause natural
death and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serves
only to postpone the moment of death." '6 6 The definition appears
to be slightly less restrictive than that of some states in that it con-
tains no requirement that death must occur within a short period
of time67 or that death must be imminent. 61 Wisconsin's requirement
that the terminal condition must cause the death of a qualified pa-
tient within thirty days is probably the most specific and restrictive
of the definitional qualifications for coverage under a natural death
act.
69
Further restrictions in the acts are found in the form through
which individuals may exercise the right to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining procedures.
2. Living Wills
In defining "qualified patient," the requirement of execution of
a living will is usually included. The living will expresses the desire
of the patient that his or her dying not be prolonged by life-sus-
taining procedures, and it directs the withholding or withdrawal of
such procedures in the event that the declarant becomes incompetent
(unable to express his or her desires) and in a terminal condition.
Most acts provide mandatory or optional forms for the living will.
- Id. § 16-30-2(6) (1985).
6 See generally ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.100(7) (1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1987).
61 CAL. HAILT AND SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (Deering Supp. 1987).
69 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West Supp. 1985).
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The formal requirements to be adhered to in the execution of
a testamentary will are also adhered to in most states to restrict the
class of persons qualified to execute the living will and the proce-
dures to be followed during such execution. The declarant, for ex-
ample, must be of legal age and of sound mind.70 Most acts also
contain a presumption that the declarant making a living will was
competent when the document was executed.
71
The legal procedure most often formulated by the natural death
acts requires that the document be in writing, signed by the declarant
or at his or her direction in the declarant's presence, dated, and
signed in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.72 The
acts also specify those not qualified to serve as witnesses. This ex-
clusion usually applies to persons who have signed the living will
for the declarant at his or her direction, persons related by blood
or marriage to the declarant or who may have an interest in the
declarant's estate, and persons who are responsible for the declar-
ant's medical expenses. 73 Also commonly excluded are employees of
the health care institution in which the declarant is a patient. 74 The
signatures and attestations of the witnesses must be notarized.
7
All statutes provide for revocation procedures which are more
lenient and informal than provisions for execution of the living will.
A living will can be revoked by destroying the document, by a re-
vocation document signed and dated, or by oral expression to a
witness of legal age who signs and dates a writing.76 Only the de-
clarant or someone acting at the declarant's direction can revoke
the living will. 77 The acts uniformly provide that a qualified patient's
70 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(a) & (d) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(1) &
(4) (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.3(I) (West Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104(a);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(a) (Supp. 1986).
72 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-6(b) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1113 (Supp. 1987).
7 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(a) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(a) (1985).
7" See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(b) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104(a) (Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(a) (1985); ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1984).
7 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(b)(5) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104(a) (Supp.
1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(3)(e) (Supp. 1987).
73 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(a)(5) (1985).
71 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4 (1985); ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5(a) (1984).
7 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a) (1985).
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desires supersede the living will at all times regardless of the patient's
mental condition. 78 If an attending physician has been notified of
the existence of a living will for a qualified patient, the revocation
of the document must be communicated to the physician. 7
9
3. Immunity to Health Care Providers
All acts afford a health care provider with legal immunity for
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining procedures in accordance
with the statutory provisions. All that is usually required of the
health care provider is that the action be in good faith. 0
4. Other Provisions
Most acts contain various provisions other than those discussed
above relating to the legal effects of the acts or the rights of the
declarant. Although these other clauses of the natural death acts
differ in form, detail, inclusion, and frequency, they can be divided
into general categories.
a. Insurance
Provisions regarding insurance and the effect of an insured per-
son signing a living will are frequently considered in the natural
death acts. The insurance clauses usually contain two sections, one
relating to the effect on life insurance and one to the effect on health
care insurance.
A declarant cannot be denied a life insurance policy because he
or she has executed a living will. A life insurance policy is not mod-
ified, legally impaired or invalidated by the execution of a living
will or the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining procedures
from an insured declarant, regardless of the policy terms.8 A person
78 See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-6(a) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1108 (Supp. 1987);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.4 (West Supp. 1986).
" See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(3) (1985); IOWA CODE AlN. § 144A.4 (West Supp.
1986).
8o See generally W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (1985).
" W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8(b) (1985).
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cannot be required to execute a living will as a precondition or
prerequisite to obtaining health care insurance from an insurer.
8 2
b. Penalties
Penalties are imposed by a majority of the acts for withholding
or forging a living will or a revocation. A distinction is frequently
made between situations in which a person acts contrary to the de-
clarant's intent by continuing life-sustaining procedures and situa-
tions in which a person acts to discontinue life-sustaining procedures.
A comparison of the penalties imposed by the statutes of three states
demonstrates the range of penalties imposed and the distinction drawn
between the two situations. When a person conceals or destroys a
living will or forges a revocation of a living will so that procedures
are continued, Utah, West Virginia and New Mexico impose pen-
alties as follows:
Utah - Offense is a class A misdemeanor 83
West Virginia - Offense is a felony punishable by a
fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprison-
ment for up to three years
84
New Mexico - Offense is a third degree felony pun-
ishable by a fine of $5,000 and/or im-
prisonment for two to ten years. 85
By comparison, penalties for forging a living will or destroying a
revocation of a living will so that procedures are withdrawn are:
Utah - Offense is criminal homicide8 6
West Virginia - Offense is a felony punishable by im-
prisonment for one to five years
87
S Id. § 16-30-8(c) (1985).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1115(1) (Supp. 1986).
' W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(c) (1985).
11 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-10(B) (1986).
16 UTAi CODE ArN. § 75-2-1115(2) (Supp. 1986).
'7 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(d) (1985).
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New Mexico Offense is a second degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for ten to
fifty years and/or a fine of $10,000.8
Iowa is one of the few states with no distinction between the acts.
Under the Iowa statute, a person who acts either to continue or
withdraw life-sustaining procedures illegally is guilty of a "serious
misdemeanor. "89
Alaska imposes a civil penalty upon health care providers who
fail to comply with a directive to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures. A physician who knowingly refuses to follow
such directive has "no right to compensation for medical services
after withdrawal would have been effective" and is subject to a fine
of $1000 in addition to the actual costs of failing to comply.90
c. Suicide, Homicide, and Euthanasia
Another frequent provision of the natural death acts states that
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining procedures does not
constitute suicide or homicide for any legal purpose. 9' Obviously,
the construction against suicide applies mainly to life insurance and
that against homicide to the immunity from liability provided by
the acts to persons involved with removal of life-sustaining proce-
dures.
The statements in the acts pertaining to euthanasia, in contrast,
are based upon a legislative concern that the natural death acts may
be extended further than intended. The West Virginia statute devotes
a separate section of its Natural Death Act to euthanasia, tellingly
entitled "Prohibition. "92 Its language is fairly typical of that found
in other acts: "Nothing in this article may be construed to condone,
authorize or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative or
u N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-10(A) (1986).
0 IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.10 (West Supp. 1986).
90 ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.070 (1986).
1, See generally IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.11(1) (West Supp. 1986); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
7-8(A) (1986); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8(a) (1985); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.080(a) (1986).
92 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-10 (1985).
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deliberate act or omission to end a human life other than to permit
the natural process of dying as provided in this article." 93 This typ-
ically worded provision is reminiscent of the language used in cases
judicially recognizing brain death. The implication is that the natural
death acts are merely evolutionary statements in light of modern
medical technology, allowing health care providers to step aside, by
removing or withholding life-sustaining procedures, with immunity
to permit natural death to take place. In this sense, the natural death
acts are extensions of the reasoning that brought brain death to wide
acceptance.
Georgia's statute contains a subsection under "Effect of chapter
on other legal rights and duties" similar to West Virginia's "Pro-
hibition," but Georgia adds a unique expression of legislative intent.
After tracking the language quoted above, Georgia continues: "Fur-
thermore, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone,
authorize, or approve abortion. ' 94 The Georgia legislature appar-
ently wanted to ensure that two areas encompassed by the right of
privacy were not united by analogous reasoning, a situation arising
in a case which will be considered later.
d. Transfer of Patients
If withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining procedures is un-
acceptable to a physician or a health care provider, the natural death
acts commonly provide an alternative. If a physician is unwilling or
if it is against the policies of a health care provider to comply with
the directions of a living will, then the physician or provider is to
transfer the patient to another physician or facility where the dec-
laration of the patient will be honored. 95 This provision recognizes
the impact of an individual's exercise of a controversial right on
others who may find the required actions repugnant.
93 Id.
94 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-11(b) (1985).
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e. Preservation of Existing Rights
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have a provision
in their natural death acts specifically stating that the statutory rights
of the acts are cumulative with any preexisting rights the individual
might have. 6 For example, West Virginia's preservation clause pro-
vides:
Nothing in this article impairs or supersedes any legal right or legal responsibility
which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining procedures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of this
article are cumulative. 97
The natural death acts, in general, apply only in certain circum-
scribed situations. The acts containing preservation clauses appear
to state that any rights belonging to an individual before enactment
of the statute remain unaffected by the statute. There is a possibility
that common law rights of individuals in the states whose acts do
not have a preservation clause are limited to some extent by en-
actment of the statutes. The difference, however, may be more il-
lusory than real.
Florida has a broad and specific preservation of existing rights
section 98 that the Florida appellate court construed in a case litigating
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from an incompetent pa-
96 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9(d)(1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.080(e) (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7193 (Deering Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2429(a) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.15
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-11(a) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 709(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-18(e) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.11(5) (West
Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANm. § 65-28,108(d) (1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1299.58.10(C) (West
1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2929(5) (1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-610(1)
(1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055(2) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(5) (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 449.680 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:16 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-
9 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.085(2) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-110(d) (1986); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1117(4) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:12 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(a) (1985);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.11(4) (West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 35-22-108(d) (Supp, 1986).
" W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(a) (1985).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.15 (West 1986).
The provisions of sections 765.01-765.15 are cumulative to the existing law regarding an
individual's right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment and do not impair
any existing rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, a patient, including a
minor or incompetent patient, or a patient's family may have in regard to the withholding
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tient. 9 Florida specifically excludes withdrawal of nutrition and hy-
dration from life-sustaining procedures which may be withdrawn
under its natural death act. Withdrawal of nutrition and hydration
was allowed because the act was "supplemental to existing rights
and laws."' 00 The preservation clause "protect[ed] all constitutional
rights a patient might have or else the statute would be unconsti-
tutional."'' ° Even if there were no such clause in the statute, "[t]he
right protected is a constitutional right which could not be limited
by legislation." 0 2
Any apparent infringement on the common law by natural death
acts without a preservation clause is probably nonexistent since the
patient's rights could be asserted under the constitutional basis.
f. Pregnancy
Thirteen states have sections dealing with the pregnant qualified
patient.0 3 Life-sustaining procedures will not be withdrawn or with-
held in compliance with a living will from a pregnant qualified pa-
tient during the pregnancy or as long as it is probable that the fetus
could develop to birth.
g. No Living Will Executed
There are two provisions found in the natural death acts which
consider the effect of the absence of an executed living will on a
qualified patient. A common approach provides that no presumption
of the patient's intent is created when the patient has not executed
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
' Id. at 372.
,0 Id. at 370.
02 Id. at 372.
'o' ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (1986); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3205(D) (1985); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West Supp. 1987); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.6(2) (Vest Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (Vest 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,
103(a) (1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107 (1984); Nav. REv. STAT. § 449.610 (1977); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14(I) (1985); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon 1985); UTAH CODE
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a living will. 104 If an incompetent patient in a terminal condition has
not made a living will, the absence of the document cannot be used
to create a presumption that the patient desired either the contin-
uance or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures.
Nine states have statutory procedures to be followed if a qualified
patient has not executed a living will.105 The first qualification in
these sections is that the person must be a qualified patient, usually
in a terminal, irreversible condition and comatose or unable to com-
municate. The statutes generally specify that the attending physician
can determine whether the patient is qualified, but Oregon and North
Carolina require confirmation of the patient's condition by other
physicians .106
Safeguards are incorporated into the sections by the requirements
for the decision-making procedure. Typically, the attending physi-
cian and one set of classes of individuals, listed in the order of
priority in the statutes, consult and agree in writing that life-sus-
taining procedures should be removed from the qualified patient,
guided by the express or implied intentions of the patient. Classes
included in the acts are judicially appointed guardians, attorneys-
in-fact, persons designated in writing by the patient to make treat-
ment decisions for him or her if the patient is incompetent, the
patient's spouse, adult child or a majority of adult children, parents,
and nearest living relatives. The priority and members of the classes
vary from act to act. Frequently one or two witnesses are required
to the agreement between the attending physician and the acting
class.
New Mexico's section allows "maintenance medical treatment"
to be removed from the qualified patient after a physician has sat-
,1, See generally IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.11(4) (West Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE
ANN. § 5-610(2) (1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(b) (1985) (West Virginia's provision states "to the
use of withholding of life-sustaining procedures," which is probably a typographical error. The usual
language provides "to the use or withholding of life-sustaining procedures.").
,oS IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (,Vest Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 1986); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1299.58.5 (West 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. §
97.083 (1985); Tax. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.7
(West Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 (1983); N.M. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1984).
'6o OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083(1)(b) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (1985).
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isfied two requirements. First, the physician must use reasonable
diligence to contact all family members available. Second, the family
members must agree "in good faith that the patient, if competent,
would choose to forego that treatment."' 107
Oregon's statute is also anomalous in one respect. If none of
the classes listed is available to make a decision, life-sustaining pro-
cedures may be removed under the direction of a physician. 08 Or-
egon, however, has more stringent requirements for a qualified patient
than do other states when no declaration has been executed. As
noted above, a committee of physicians, with the attending physician
excluded, must certify the patient's condition.
h. Special Power of Attorney
The special power of attorney allows an individual to designate
another person to make health care treatment decisions if the in-
dividual becomes incompetent. In Florida's statute, one of the classes
of others in the section "Procedure in the absence of a declaration"
is "person(s) designated by the patient in writing to make treatment
decisions for him should he be diagnosed as suffering from a ter-
minal condition."' 1 9 Utah's natural death act contains a separate
section for the power of attorney and a mandatory form for the
document.1' 0 Utah requires that the person designated to act as an
attorney-in-fact be an adult, and the power of attorney is effective
only when the principal is "unable to give current directions" be-
cause of his or her physical or mental condition.,"
A durable power of attorney, which is similar to a special power
of attorney, is statutorily provided for in some other states." 2 How-
ever, the durable power of attorney does not specifically provide
for decisions by an attorney-in-fact in medical situationsY" It is
107 N.M. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1(A) (1984).
'*' OR. REv. STAT. § 97.083(3) (1983).
109 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07(1)(b) (West 1986).
"o UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (1985).
,' Id. § 75-2-1106(1) (1985).
11 DEATH AND DYING, supra note 2, § 16.10 at 195 (Supp. 1986).
" See W. VA. CODE § 39-4-1 to -7 (Supp. 1986).
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unclear whether it could legally be used to withhold or withdraw
any form of medical treatment absent a plain declaration of leg-
islative intent that it could indeed be so used. This is particularly
true considering the narrowly drawn nature of the natural death acts.
i. Patients in Nursing Home Facilities
Four states and the District of Columbia have special require-
ments for witnessing a living will executed by a patient in a nursing
home facility. 114 The obvious intent is to safeguard this type of pro-
tected patient. Colorado excludes other patients or residents of the
health care facility as witnesses." 5 Delaware and the District of Co-
lumbia require that one of the witnesses to the living will be a patient
advocate or ombudsman." 6 In addition to two witnesses to the living
will, Georgia requires that the chief of the hospital medical staff or
the medical director be a witness." 7
5. The Effect of the Natural Death Acts
Generally, the natural death acts are narrowly drawn. They apply
only to the incompetent patient in a terminal, irreversible, incurable
condition who would die regardless of life-sustaining procedures and
who, with the exceptions noted, has executed a living will while
competent. The publicity about the plight of Karen Ann Quinlan
provided the catalyst for these acts, but the irony is that she would
not have been a qualified patient under the statutes' definitions. The
natural death acts, with one exception, do not address the patient
who is incurably comotose but whose brain stem continues to func-
tion. I
The exception is New Mexico's Right to Die statute." 8 New Mex-
ico's act provides that an adult of sound mind may execute a living
"4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-106(2) (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2506(c) (1982); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2423 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14(III)
(1985).
M COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-106(2) (1985).
226 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 2506(c) (1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2423 (1982).
127 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (1984).
"8 N.M. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1984).
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will directing that "maintenance medical treatment" not be used to
prolong his or her life if the adult is "suffering from a terminal
illness or ... [is] in an irreversible coma."'1 9 "Irreversible coma"
is defined as "that state in which brainstem functions remain but
the major components of the cerebrum are irreversibly destroyed." 120
"Maintenance medical treatment" is defined as "medical treatment
designed solely to sustain the life processes. ' 121 "Terminal illness"
is defined as "an illness that will result in death . . . regardless of
the use or discontinuance of maintenance medical treatment.'
122
There is no requirement that death occur within a short time or
imminently, or that the treatment only prolong the dying process.
The broad scope of the language of this statute would seem to cover
most contingencies short of assisted suicide and euthanasia.
IV. THE COURTS AND TER NATION OF LiFE-susTAINING
TREATNMNT
Quinlan was the seminal case in judicial consideration of the
termination of medical treatment. It was important not only for its
substantive holdings but also because it set the pattern of analysis
for future cases.
A. The Pattern of Analysis
1. The Factual Basis
The factual background is the beginning of all judicial consid-
erations of the right to refuse medical treatment. The factors con-
sidered are the competency or incompetency of the patient, the
physical condition and prognosis of the patient, and the presence
or absence of any written or verbal prior expression of intent by
the patient.
,, Id. § 24-7-3(A) (1984).
,2 Id. § 24-7-2(B) (1984).
I2t d. § 24-7-2(C) (1984).
,2 Id. § 24-7-2(F) (1984).
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2. The Rights of the Individual
The legal analysis begins with a determination of the bases for
the assertion of the rights of the individual. Common law, consti-
tutional law, and statutory rights are analyzed, in varying combi-
nations.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that consideration of
the common law alone was sufficient. The court refused to reach
any constitutional questions since relief was "adequately supported
by common law principles."' 23
The New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision on constitu-
tional principles, without considering the common law, holding that
the penumbral right of privacy in the Bill of Rights and in New
Jersey's Constitution encompassed the right to refuse medical treat-
ment and that the right was not destroyed by the individual's in-
competency. 24 The Supreme Court of Washington analyzed the
application of the penumbral right of privacy in the United States
Constitution in more detail, using a traditional constitutional anal-
ysis of application through the fourteenth amendment. 125 The court
listed the following four state actions which created a "sufficient
nexus between the state and the prohibitions against withholding or
discontinuance of life sustaining treatment": 2 6 The state had the
power to impose "criminal sanctions on the hospital and its staff",
the state licensed physicians, the judiciary was required to be in-
volved in appointment of a guardian, and the state had a "parens
patria responsibility to supervise the affairs of incompetents. ' 12 7
Enactment of the natural death acts has added little to the anal-
ysis of the rights of an individual in cases brought before the courts.
Execution of a living will usually gives the court only a concrete
expression of an incompetent patient's wishes regarding artificial
medical treatment. The Supreme Court of Florida called the living
will "persuasive evidence of [an] incompetent patient's decision,"
123 Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
124 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 663, 664.
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but the court also held that its primary use was to guide "the person
or persons who substitute their judgment on behalf of the terminally
ill incompetent." ' 128 With that construction, the natural death acts
and the execution of a living will appear to be more useful in the
factual basis as expressive of prior intent than as determinative of
the rights of individuals.
3. The Countervailing State Interests
The right to refuse medical treatment encompassed by the right
of privacy must be balanced against state interests. The state interests
commonly identified are the preservation and sanctity of human life,
prevention of suicide, maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession, and protection of innocent third parties. The preser-
vation and sanctity of human life is probably the most important
state interest advanced. Apparently in contemplation of this interest,
a majority of the courts has rejected any analysis of the individual's
"quality of life" as a factor to be considered in decisions allowing
or forbidding termination of treatment. 129
Prevention of suicide is sometimes reasoned to be subsumed in
the state's interest in the preservation and sanctity of human life.
The Quinlan court, in its discussion of the preservation and sanctity
of human life, drew a distinction between an act of self-destruction
and one of self-determination. 30 The Massachusetts court observed
in 1977 that a patient exercising his or her right of medical self-
determination "may not have the specific intent to die," and even
if the patient did have that specific intent, refusal of medical treat-
ment would lead to death from natural causes, not from suicide.'3
"[T]he patient did not set the death producing agent in motion with
the intent of causing his own death."' 3 2 This analysis has been widely
': John F. Kennedy Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
,2' See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1226; Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 754, 370 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1977); c.f. Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983).
110 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 655.
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used by the courts when discussing the state's interests in preserving
life and preventing suicide.
Maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession
received its most extensive analysis in Quinlan. Judicial decisions
after Quinlan tend to quote most of the language used and rather
summarily discount this state interest. It has not proved to be an
"ineluctable bar" to any court's decision to allow termination of
medical treatment. A Catholic hospital, with "a strong institutional
policy" against participating in the withholding of foods or fluids
from a patient, brought a court action to compel a competent, ter-
minally ill patient to leave the hospital because she had decided to
refuse artificial feeding. 3 3 The court refused to grant the relief re-
quested. The burdens to be incurred by the patient if she were com-
pelled to move outweighed the burdens on the hospital if she were
allowed to remain there until her death. The court stated that "judges
should not defer to hospital decisions which are unreasonable or
which improperly burden patients or impair patient rights."'' 34
A California hospital refused to remove a ventilator and re-
straints from a competent patient, who had delivered a living will,
a signed declaration, a durable power of attorney, and releases from
the family. 135 The hospital based its refusal on the following four
grounds: (1) the patient was not in a terminal condition; (2) the
patient had vacillated about his decision, frantically motioning for
the ventilator to be reconnected when a tube was accidentally de-
tached, and had made inconsistent statements; (3) the institution was
a Christian hospital and disconnecting the ventilator was unethical;
and (4) the health care providers were concerned about liability. 3,
The trial court refused to issue an injunction against the hospital
because there was a potential for "cognitive, sapient life." The ap-
pellate court held that the trial court erred, stating, "[I]f the right
of the patient to self-determination as to his own medical treatment
is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interests
3 In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 477, 517 A.2d 886, 887 (1986).
13 Id. at 488, 517 A.2d at 893.
13, Battling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 190-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1984).
316 Id. at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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of the patient's hospital and doctors."'13 7 The patient was competent
to make the decision and occasional vacillation did not make his
competency questionable.138 As examples of the judiciary's willing-
ness to maintain the ethical integrity of the medical profession, these
two cases are probably not extreme examples.
The theory behind the state's interest in protecting third parties
is that "the patient's exercise of his free choice could adversely and
directly affect the health, safety, or security or others."' 139 This in-
terest rarely plays any major role in a court's analysis of termination
of medical treatment. This is primarily because the patients involved
are usually elderly, in a terminal or irreversible condition, have no
minor children, and the spouse, children, or nearest relative is usu-
ally the petitioner. There is no "innocent third party" adversely
affected by the exercise of the individual's rights, and the exercise
of those rights would not create a "public health or safety haz-
ard."140
4. The Decision-Maker
If a patient is competent, no question arises as to who has the
right to make treatment decisions. The Quinlan court immediately
recognized that Karen Ann Quinlan, if competent and aware of her
hopeless condition, "could effectively decide upon discontinuance
of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural
death. 1 41 Ten years later the New Jersey Superior Court stated,
with very little analysis, that it was "absolutely clear" that a com-
petent patient had a legal right to refuse to be artificially fed even
though it meant an earlier death. 14
2
If a patient is incompetent, however, a representative must ex-
ercise the patient's right to determine his or her own treatment. The
Quinlan court placed the decision-making power with the family,
W Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 227.
M Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223, 224.
M Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
110 Id. at 355, 486 A.2d 1226.
141 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
142 Requena, 213 N.J. Super. at 479, 517 A.2d at 888.
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with qualifications. The family, using its best judgment, was to de-
cide whether the patient would have exercised her constitutional right
of privacy to have the respirator removed. 143 The pattern which has
developed in cases considering termination of artificial medical treat-
ment has followed Quinlan and is frequently called "substituted
judgment."' 144 "[T]he goal is to determine with as much accuracy
as possible the wants and needs of the individual involved."' 4 The
patients are safeguarded from possible abusive exercises of substi-
tuted judgment by procedures set forth by the courts.
5. Procedure for Decision-Making
The New Jersey Supreme Court set up a three-tiered process of
decision-making for incompetent patients. The attending physician
must first conclude "that there is no reasonable possibility of [the
patient's return] ... to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-
support apparatus ... should be discontinued."' 146 The person who
asserts the patient's right to terminate treatment, usually the spouse
or next of kin, is to use his or her best judgment as to what the
patient would have wanted, with general concurrence by the patient's
guardian, if any, and the family. 147 The Quinlan court called for
the formation of an Ethics Committee at hospitals or institutions.
The function of the Ethics Committee is to assist and safeguard the
interests of the patient and the medical personnel, screening out
unworthy motivations and diffusing responsibility for the decision.
The Ethics Committee, in effect, reviews the prognosis for the pa-
tient; and if the committee agrees that no reasonable possibility exists
that the patient will return to a cognitive, sapient state, then the
life-support system may be withdrawn.' 48 The court did not require
judicial approval of the decision.
Other states have insisted on their own forms of safeguarding
procedures. For example, the Washington Supreme Court required
141 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
'" See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 430; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8 (1984).
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
", Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
"7 Id. at 50, 54, 355 A.2d at 664, 671.
,, Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
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that a "prognosis board" unanimously concur that "there is no
reasonable medical probability of returning to a cognitive, sapient
state.' 1 49 A guardian for the incompetent patient and a guardian ad
litem to represent the patient's best interest in any court proceedings
would be appointed by the court before any decision was made. The
court would intervene further in the decision-making process only
if the prognosis board could not agree or if "a court determination
of the rights and wishes of the incompetent" was required. 150 Mas-
sachusetts requires a much more active role for the courts. A guard-
ian and a guardian ad litem are appointed; all viewpoints are argued
in front of a judge; and the judge issues an order regarding the
treatment. This procedure appears to result in judicial substituted
judgment.' 5' The Massachusetts court later held that prior judicial
approval was not necessary in every case, but it did not make clear
in what cases judicial approval was not needed. 152 It seems unlikely
that health care providers will act without prior court approval.
B. The Effect of Prior Verbal and Written Expressions of
Intent
One of the most important aspects of the courts' analyses in
deciding to withhold or continue life-support maintenance of pa-
tients is the consideration of how the patients would choose to ex-
ercise their right of self-determination. In Quinlan, evidence was
submitted to the trial court that Karen, when competent, had ver-
bally stated that she would not wish her life prolonged by extraor-
dinary means. The trial court rejected this evidence as lacking
"significant probative weight" because it was remote and imper-
sonal, and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed. 53 The court later
declared that it was in error in rejecting this evidence. 54 When a
patient has previously expressed an intent to refuse some forms of
Colyer, 99 Wash.2d at 136, 660 P.2d at 749-50.
1 Id. at 137, 660 P.2d at 750-51.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 756-57, 370 N.E.2d at 433-34.
112 Spring, 380 Mass. at 642, 405 N.E.2d at 120-21.
"I Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
"* Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
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medical treatment upon the occurrence of some contingent physical
condition, the expression of intent has almost become the deter-
minative factor in judicial decisions to allow termination of artificial
medical treatment. 155
Factors providing guidelines for the probative value of prior ver-
bal expressions were discussed in Eichner v. Dillon.'56 Brother Fox,
an eighty-three year old member of a religious order, suffered brain
damage during an operation. While the Quinlan case was receiving
wide publicity, his religious order held formal discussions about the
moral principles involved. Brother Fox stated then that he agreed
with Catholic principles permitting "termination of extraordinary
life support systems when there is no reasonable hope for... re-
covery" and that "he would not want any of this 'extraordinary
business' done for him under those circumstances." 57 A few months
before his operation, he reiterated those views. When his religious
superior petitioned the court for removal of the respirator main-
taining Brother Fox's breathing, the court held that the level of
proof for evidence of the patient's intent was "clear and con-
vincing."' 158 Evidence of Brother Fox's prior statements met that
burden. His religious beliefs supported the conclusion that Brother
Fox had carefully reflected on his expressed views. The only motive
of the witnesses who testified regarding those expressions was to see
that Brother Fox's wishes were fulfilled. His expressions were "sol-
emn pronouncements and not casual remarks."' 5 9 Brother Fox was
old enough to "realize or feel the consequences of his statement."' 160
He reiterated his decision shortly before he became incompetent,
and his physical state was identical to that of Karen Ann Quinlan,
which had "prompted his decision.' ' 6'
In a 1984 Florida case, an incompetent, terminally ill patient had
executed a living wili; and the hospital, fearing liability, sought ju-
01 Cf. Delio v. Westchester Co. Medical Center, 134 Misc. 2d 206, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1986),
rev'd, No. 87-1481E, slip op. -(N.Y. App. Div. June 1, 1987) (WEsTLAW).
116 Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 363, 420 N.E.2d at 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
117 Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
I rd. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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dicial determination of its rights and liabilities. 162 The district court
affirmed the trial court's requirement of court approval of termi-
nation of medical procedures, holding that a "mercy will" could
not be equated with the capability of a competent patient to exercise
his right of privacy. The "mercy will" could be introduced into
evidence as the "best evidence of the patient's intention," but the
district court also required that due execution of the will and the
mental capacity of the patient be proved by testimony or affidavit. 163
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court.
The court held that judicial approval of termination of treatment
was not required, the decision should be made in the "patient-doc-
tor-family relationship" using substituted judgment, and a "living"
or "mercy" will was "persuasive evidence of [the] incompetent per-
son's intention."64
A prior expression of intent, whether verbal or written, is typ-
ically determinative of a patient's choice in terminating treatment.
It is analogous to the dead man's hand behind a will; the patient
speaks from beyond incompetency as the testator does from beyond
the grave. It appears to be relatively uncommon now for a life-
support system to be continued when there is a prior expression of
intent in opposition by the patient.
C. When There Is No Expression of Prior Intent
A person who becomes incompetent, is incurable, terminal, or
comotose, and who has never expressed any preference regarding
medical procedures is in much the same situation as Karen Ann
Quinlan. Substitute judgment, determining as nearly as possible what
the patient would have decided, is used in much the same way as
it was in the Quinlan case.
The Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court, using its substituted
judgment procedure, allowed termination of hemodialysis treatments
for a senile patient suffering from "end-stage kidney disease.' ' 65
6 Bludworth, 452 So.2d at 922.
161 Id. at 923.
,14 Id. at 926.
" Spring, 380 Mass. at 632, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
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The court affirmed use of substituted judgment to exercise an in-
competent's right to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of...
bodily integrity."' 166 Hemodialysis was a greater invasion of bodily
integrity than orally or intravenously administered medications, and
the patient was incapable of understanding the need for treatment. 6 7
The treatments were "life-prolonging rather than life-saving," 68 and
the court found that that the patient would have chosen not to
receive the treatment if he were competent and aware of his con-
dition.
Sandra Foody aspirated while eating, suffered brain damage, and
lapsed into a semicomatose state, breathing with the assistance of
a respirator. She had never expressed any desires about her treatment
if she were ever in this state. Her parents brought an injunctive
action against the hospital for the discontinuance of the life-support
system maintaining her respiration and pulse. 69 Because her prog-
nosis was poor, the treatment intrusive, and the benefits of the treat-
ment to her minimal, the Connecticut Superior Court held that her
right to terminate the life-support systems could be exercised by her
parents through substituted judgment. 170
The Foody court succinctly stated the principle generally used
by the courts when an incompetent patient has not made known his
or her choice. "An expression of intent while competent is not es-
sential, the opinion may be based upon knowledge of the individual
from a family relationship.'1
7'
D. The Patient Who Was Never Competent
The situation with a patient who has always been incompetent
is different than those considered above. There can usually be no
prior expressions of desires regarding medical treatment, and it is
166 Id. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119.
167 The patient was uncooperative during the dialysis treatments, kicking nurses, resisting trans-
portation, and pulling the needles from his arm. Id. at 632, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
16 Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
16 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 40 Conn. Supp. 127, -, 483 A.2d 713, 715
(1984).
170 Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at -, 482 A.2d at 719-20.
7Id. at -, 482 A.2d at 721.
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difficult or impossible to determine what the person would have
decided if competent. The two cases considered in this category con-
cern profoundly retarded individuals.
Joseph Saikewicz was 67 years old, suffering from leukemia, and
a resident of state institutions for 54 years. 172 The institution peti-
tioned for a guardian to be appointed for him so that medical de-
cisions could be made. The guardian ad litem recommended that he
not undergo chemotherapy because Saikewicz was unable to un-
derstand the treatment, and the resulting fear and discomfort would
outweigh the "possibility of some uncertain but limited extension
of life.' 73 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again used
the substitute judgment doctrine, but tailored it to the facts of the
case. The decision "should be that which would be made by the
incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into
account the present and future incompetency of the individual." 174
Factors weighing against the administration of chemotherapy were
the patient's inability to cooperate in his treatment, his age, the
suffering and side effects caused by the treatment, and the prognosis
with the treatment. The court rejected quality of life as a factor
insofar as it "demeans the value of the life of one who is mentally
retarded.' 1 75 Mr. Saikewicz had the same substantive rights "to de-
cline potentially life-prolonging treatment" as a competent person,
176
and the court decided that, considering all the factors, he would
elect to enforce his "right to privacy and self-determination.'
' 77
The mother of a profoundly retarded, institutionalized man suf-
fering from terminal cancer of the bladder refused to permit trans-
fusions to counteract the possibly terminal bleeding caused by the
cancer. 78 The New York Court of Appeals decided that it was un-
realistic to try to determine what the patient's decision concerning
172 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
M Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
174 Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
" Id. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
176 Id. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
" In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 373, 420 N.E.2d 64, 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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the treatment would be if he were competent. Instead, the court
noted that "[m]entally John Storar was an infant and that is the
only realistic way to assess his rights.' 1 79 Whether to allow or deny
the transfusions was analyzed on a parent-child basis. A parent has
the right to consent to the medical treatment of his or her child but
does not have the right to decline treatment when the child's life is
endangered. The latter was the situation encountered by the court
in this case. The patient could bleed to death if he was not trans-
fused. The transfusions were not excessively intrusive, and his phys-
ical and mental conditions were affected when he was not transfused.
The court recognized the complications engendered by two serious
illnesses; the transfusions would not cure the cancer, but they could
"eliminate the risk of death from another treatable cause. ' 180 The
transfusions were allowed to be administered.
The court in Storar used the same analysis as that used in other
termination of treatment cases, but it was based on a determination
of the mother's rights in the situation instead of the incompetent
adult's rights. Although not specifically articulated, the incompetent
adult in this case was placed by the court in the position of an
innocent third party who could be harmed by the exercise of the
mother's rights. The presence of the potentially harmed innocent
third party tipped the scales in favor of prevention of the exercise
of the individual's rights (the mother's) in the balancing test.
The two lines of analysis used when a patient has never been
competent, substituted judgment and parent-child, employ a benefits
versus burdens of treatment analysis to decide the results. The prog-
nosis of the patient's condition and the intrusiveness of the pro-
cedure, particularly considering the patient's inability to comprehend,
are major factors in both analyses; the analysis itself is in the fa-
miliar pattern set by Quinlan. If the treatment in question in Storar
had been for the cancer, the result may have been different.
E. Nutrition and Hydration
One situation not discussed in the previous cases concerns the
person who has sufficient brain stem function to be capable of
17 Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
110 Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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breathing without the aid of artificial means. Such an individual has
been known to linger in a comatose vegetative state for up to thirty-
seven years. 8 ' A solution that recently has been employed is to with-
hold nutrition and hydration, food and water, from the comatose
individual to allow him to die.
Nutrition and hydration are not administered to comatose pa-
tients in the normal manner of ingestion. Instead, nutrients and
fluids are fed into the patient's body through tubes. There is con-
troversy over whether nutrition and hydration administered by this
method qualify as medical treatment which can be refused. To many,
withdrawal appears to be an unattractive form of euthanasia. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court drew a distinction between
"those situations in which the withholding of extraordinary measures
may be viewed as allowing the disease to take its natural course and
those in which the same actions may be deemed to have been the
cause of death.' ' 8 2 The Massachusetts court called this a "subtle
distinction,' 1 83 and the subtlety is sometimes lost when the issue is
withholding nutrition and hydration.
1. The First Cases
Probably the first case to hold that nutrition and hydration could
be withdrawn from an incompetent patient was decided in 1980 in
Delaware. A woman who suffered upper brain damage in an au-
tomobile accident was able to breathe without mechanical assistance
and received nourishment from a nasogastric tube. 184 Her husband
requested an order from the Delaware court directing her health care
providers to refrain from acting if her condition worsened, including
refraining from surgical procedure to place a feeding tube in her
trachea.' 85 Evidence was presented that she had stated she "did not
want to be kept alive in a vegetative state," that she was a former
member of the Delaware Euthanasia Education Council, and that
,M1 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (1986).
M Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
183 Id.
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she had not signed a living will only because of her husband's re-
luctance to reciprocate. 86 The court used the Quinlan analysis, re-
cognizing the effect of the right of privacy in medical decisions and
the opposing state interests. The requested relief was granted. No
known medical procedures would cure or restore the patient; and,
the court observed, the distinction between ordinary and extraor-
dinary medical care blurs when a person is "in an apparently non-
reversible vegetative state."' 1 Apparently the nasogastric tube was
left in place, but no surgical procedures were to be performed if
some other kind of feeding device became necessary.
In 1983 two physicians in California were charged with murder
and conspiracy to commit murder because they had agreed with a
patient's family to remove the tubes providing nutrition and hy-
dration to the patient. 188 The physicians filed writs of prohibition
with the California court, and the court concluded that the phy-
sicians' conduct, even "though intentional and with knowledge that
the patient would die, was not an unlawful failure to perform a
legal duty.' 1 89 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the
rights of the patient and the nature of the treatment. Administration
of nutrition and hydration was viewed as being the same as me-
chanical life-support equipment, manual injections, or medication.
It was "more similar to other medical procedures than to typical
human ways of providing nutrition and hydration."' 90 The admin-
istration of nutrition and hydration would not cure the patient or
alleviate his condition, and the physicians did not have a duty to
continue ineffective treatment. 191 The court enunciated guidelines for
the continuance of treatment. It rejected the distinction between or-
dinary and extraordinary treatment, favoring instead a benefits ver-
sus burdens of treatment standard, the benefits of the treatment
outweighing the burdens if the patient's life was lengthened under
acceptable conditions. 92 As usual, the paramount consideration in
196 Id.
187 Id.
M Barber, 147 Cal; App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
10 Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
1 Id. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
191 Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
9 Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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any decision is the patient's interests and desires; and a surrogate
could exercise the patient's right to choose, guided by "the patient's
best interests."
93
In re Hier,194 decided in 1984, involved a 92 year old psychotic
patient unable to ingest food by mouth who was fed through a
gastronomy tube, which she repeatedly pulled out. She eventually
refused to allow the tube to be reinserted, and the nursing home
petitioned for appointment of a guardian to make medical judgments
for her. The Massachusetts Appeals Court applied the substituted
judgment doctrine and agreed that the patient, if competent, would
reject surgery to reinsert the tube. 195 Factors considered were the
burden and intrusiveness of the surgery, the patient's objections, the
decreased benefits of the treatment because of the patient's lack of
cooperation, and the concurrence of the patient's physicians. The
court refused to draw a distinction between nutrition and other med-
ical treatments. 96
A severely demented nursing home patient, who had "no higher
functioning or consciousness" but some response to her surround-
ings, was the subject of a 1985 New Jersey case involving removal
of a nasogastric tube. 97 The Appellate Division refused to allow
removal of the tube. Such an action would "hasten death rather
than simply allow the illness to take its natural course ....
[W]ithdrawal of [the] nasogastric tube would be tantamount to kill-
ing her - not simply letting her die - and ... such active eu-
thanasia was ethically impermissible."' 98 On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expressly rejected assessment of another's quality of
life as a basis for decision-making; instead the "primary focus should
be the patient's desires and experience of pain and enjoyment - not
the type of treatment involved."' 99 Also expressly rejected were dis-
"I Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
,1, In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959, review denied, 393 Mass. 1101, 465
N.E.2d 261 (1984).
91 Hier, 465 N.E.2d at 964-65.
"1 Id. at 964.
Conroy, 98 N.J. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1216-17.
" Id. at 341-42, 486 A.2d at 1219.
Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
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tinctions between actively terminating treatment and passively al-
lowing an individual to die naturally, 20° between withholding and
withdrawing treatment, between ordinary and extrodinary treat-
ment, 201 and between terminating artificial sustenance and other
medical procedures. 20 2 Artificial sustenance supplied through "na-
sogastric tubes, gastronomies, and intravenous infusions ... are
medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, in-
stituted by skilled health-care providers to compensate for impaired
physical functioning. "203 The patient, "if competent to make the
decision and if resolute in her determination, could have chosen to
have her nasogastric tube withdrawn," 2°4 and an incompetent patient
has the same right as a competent patient to reject "any medical
treatment, including artificial feeding. '20 5 However, the nursing home
patient in this case, a member of a protected class, would not have
met the tests the court set out for the exercise of the rights of a
patient in a nursing home situation.
2. The 1986 Cases
In 1986, five cases involving issues of rejecting or withdrawing
nutrition and hydration were decided. All of the jurisdictions had
previously considered cases involving termination of some form of
artificial medical maintenance treatment.20 6
In California, Elizabeth Bouvia, a bedridden quadriplegic af-
flicted with cerebral palsy and crippling arthritis, petitioned the court
to remove a nasogastric tube which had been inserted without her
consent. 20 7 In 1983, the California courts had refused to allow her
to starve herself to death in a public hospital, and her current health
care providers were concerned that she was again attempting suicide.
2 Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233-34.
20, Id. at 369-70, 486 A.2d at 1234.
Id. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1236.
20, Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236.
Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1226.
2 Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
21 California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey.
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The trial court agreed with the health care providers that she was
again attempting suicide,2 8 but the appellate court disagreed. The
court concluded that the common-law basis of self-determination
gave an adult of sound mind "the right to refuse any medical treat-
ment, even that which may save or prolong her life. ' ' 209 The exercise
of the "basic and fundamental" constitutional right of privacy
"requires no one's approval. It is not merely one vote subject to
being overridden by medical opinion. ' ' 210 The California court, in
contrast to the analysis of other courts, considered the quality of
the patient's life significant. Because of Bouvia's condition, "the
quality of her life [had] been diminished to the point of hopelessness,
uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. ' 211 Her irreversible con-
dition, future helplessness, and the consequences of her helplessness
would make her life an ordeal; and under these conditions, "it [was]
... immaterial that the removal of the nasogastric tube [would]
hasten or cause Bouvia's eventual deatfi. ' 212 The appellate court held
that the trial court had erred by considering the possible motives
behind the patient's decision. "If a right exists, it matters not what
'motivates' its exercise, ' 12 and the appellate court ordered the na-
sogastric tube removed.
Bouvia is a startling case, not so much because of the result,
but for the strength of the language used and the extent of the right
of privacy implied by the California court. When discussing the
possible suicide motiviation, the court stated that "a desire to ter-
minate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right of
privacy. ' 21 4 The opinion is also surprising in its emphasis on the
quality of life, an assessment expressly rejected by some courts in
termination of treatment cases.
In re Requena, a New Jersey case, also involved a competent
patient's desire to refuse a nasogastric tube; and the hospital in
Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
11 Id. at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (emphasis in original).
210 Id. at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
2 Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
22 Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
223 Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
224 Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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which she was a patient brought this action to compel her to transfer
to another hospital. 215 There was no question in the New Jersey
Superior Court's opinion that the patient had the legal right to refuse
the nasogastric tube. Her action was not suicide because there was
no "positive act to terminate life. ' 216 Instead, her decision was an
acceptance of and acquiescence in the natural process of dying
reached after careful consideration and with an understanding of all
the implications. 217 The hospital contended that its "pro-life" policy
forbade it to participate in "denying food and water to a patient. 218
The court inferred that the hospital was confusing abortion issues
with Requena's situation and stated that "[tihere is no sensible com-
parison to be drawn between the two situations. ' 21 9 She had merely
"accept[ed] death and... surrender[ed] to the dying process. ' 220
The health care providers in a Florida case sought a declaratory
judgment regarding removal of a nasogastric tube from a 75 year-
old patient in a permanent vegetative state.221 The trial court held
that the right of privacy did not extend to withholding nutrition and
hydration supplied through a nasogastric tube. The Florida Right
to Decline Life-Prolonging Procedures Act specifically excluded nu-
trition and hydration from coverage. The district court held that the
trial court had erred. The Florida natural death act "was not in-
tended to encompass the entire spectrum of instances in which these
privacy rights may be exercised.''222 The preservation of rights sec-
tion in the Florida act protected all constitutional rights, and the
act itself applied only to a certain class of patients, those who wish
to decline the statutorily-defined life-sustaining procedures. The court
also found no distinction between forced artificial feeding and forced
maintenance of vital functions. It concluded that "the right to have
a nasogastric tube removed is a constitutionally protected right" in
the circumstances of this case.223
21 Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886.
216 Id. at 477, 517 A.2d at 887.
217 Id. at 478, 517 A.2d at 888.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 479, 485, 517 A.2d at 888, 891. See supra text accompanying note 94.
22 Id. at 484, 517 A.2d at 891.
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Massachusetts again considered the incompetent patient and the
substituted judgment doctrine in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc.224 Brophy's wife brought a declaratory judgment action when
the hospital refused to remove the gastronomy tube supplying him
with nutrients as his family had requested. The trial court found
that Brophy would have wanted the tube removed because of the
following factors: "(1) Brophy's expressed preferences; (2) his re-
ligious convictions and their relation to refusal of treatment; (3) the
impact on his family; (4) the probability of adverse side effects; and
(5) the prognosis, both with and without treatment. ' 25 Despite the
trial court's conclusion as to Brophy's choice if competent, it refused
to order the discontinuance of the feeding tube. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the trial court, ordering the
tube discontinued, but upheld the right of the hospital to refuse to
participate in the removal. Mr. Brophy had made repeated emphatic
statements that he would not want to be maintained by a life-support
system.2 26 He was not terminally ill but was in a condition he would
have considered demeaning and helpless. The court's view was that
artificial feeding of the patient in this condition was "intrusive treat-
ment as a matter of law." 227 Since the court upheld the hospital's
refusal to participate in removal of the feeding tube, the state's
interest against violation of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession was neutralized. 228
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center was decided in a
New York lower court on December 5, 1986.229 Daniel Delio, 33
years old, had an operation to repair an anorectal fistula. He emerged
Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626.
21 Id. at , 497 N.E.2d at 631.
2m Id. at 497 N.E.2d at 632 n.22.
Id. at, 497 N.E.2d at 636.
Id. at , 497 N.E.2d at 638.
21 Delio, 134 Misc. 2d 206, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415. This decision was reversed June 1, 1987 by the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York. The court emphasized the prior, unambiguous
statements of the patient and the common law right of self-determination (refusing to reach any
constitutional issue). The court rejected a distinction between artificial feeding and other forms of
medical treatment and any distinction between the rights of individuals based on age or medical
condition. Daniel Delio's common law right of self-determination outweighed the state's interests; and
all medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, could be discontinued. Delio v. Westchester
Co. Medical Center, No. 98-1481E (N.Y. App. Div., June 1, 1987) (WEsnAw).
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from the operation in a chronic vegetative state. He was capable of
breathing without artificial assistance but was fed through a gas-
tronomy tube. His wife and mother petitioned the New York court
to direct the hospital, or some institution where Delio could be trans-
ferred, to stop all treatment including the provision of nutrition and
hydration. Evidence was introduced, which met the clear and con-
vincing burden of proof required by the New York courts, that Mr.
Delio had occasionally "remarked that he never would want his life
prolonged by artificial means if he were in a chronic vegetative state
with no hope of recovery."' 0 The New York lower court distin-
guished the prior New York case, Eichner, in several particulars.
Brother Fox was maintained by a respirator and Mr. Delio by a
feeding tube. The respirator was a "more complex mechanism" than
a "surgical attachment to... [the] abdomen of a tube for feeding
purposes." ' 23' Removal of the respirator would cause death within
a short time, while death resulting from the removal of the feeding
tube could take days or weeks; and "[t]he furnishing of food and
drink to the ill is traditional and symbolical of the duty commonly
conceived to be due to a patient.' ' 232 The court distinguished between
the age and condition of Brother Fox, 83 and terminally ill, and
that of Mr. Delio, 33 and in no danger of imminent death. The
court implied that withholding nutrition and hydration was more
appropriate for older, terminally ill persons than for younger, rel-
atively healthy persons because of the possibility that advancements
in medical technology could eventually cure the condition.233 One
noticeable aspect of the opinion is the scant attention given to the
common law and constitutional rights involved. Where, as in Delio,
a jurisdiction lacks sufficient case law or legislative guidance, it is
surprising that more analysis was not given to the individual's rights.
The New York lower court denied removal of the feeding tube
but urged an appeal of the decision. It concluded the opinion with
Delio, 134 Misc. 2d , 51b N.Y.S.2d at 416.
23 Id. at , 510 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The lower New York court in Deio has apparently returned
to a distinction between ordinary (the feeding tube) and extraordinary (the respirator) care that other
courts have discarded or downgraded.
232 Id.
23 Id. at , 510 N.Y.2d at 418.
[Vol. 90
44
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 14
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/14
THE RIGHT TO DIE
what was, perhaps, the true reasoning behind the holding. "[Jiudicial
activism in cases such as this ... can only involve the courts in a
yet unsanctioned broad scale policy of euthanasia.
'234
3. Future Projections
To date, only a handful of jurisdictions have decided cases in-
volving termination of life-sustaining treatment or the withholding
of nutrition and hydration. It is probable that the natural death acts
will avert litigation in the narrow areas in which they apply; but as
the court noted in Delio, "more and more Courts are being called
upon to render decisions made necessary because of modern med-
icine's ability to postpone the dying process. ' 235 As proof of this,
more cases involving nutrition and hydration issues were decided in
1986 than had ever before been decided. It seems likely that more
and more courts will be called upon to more clearly determine the
parameters of the right of privacy.
Those jurisdictions without common law precedent or legislative
direction appear likely to follow the pattern of analysis discussed
in this article. It also appears probable that the courts will allow
termination or withdrawal of artificial maintenance medical treat-
ment, including nutrition and hydration, on the basis of the common
law right of self-determination, the consitutional right of privacy,
and the decisions made by patients or for patients through substi-
tuted judgment. The exercise of the right of privacy, as it is now
interpreted, is difficult to neutralize by institutions or agents of gov-
ernments advocating countervailing state interests. State legislative
action appears unlikely to be effective in stemming this trend since
the right involved is a basic and fundamental constitutional one
involving private decisions about an intimate portion of life-dying.
West Virginia is a jurisdiction which has not considered the right
of privacy and the refusal of medical treatment. It has, however,
considered the right of privacy asserted by a prisoner against being
force-fed while he was on a hunger strike. 2 6 In considering the pris-
- Id. at, 510 N.Y.2d at 420.
2 Id. at , 510 N.Y.2d at 415.
236 White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
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oner's petition for a writ of prohibition against the prison officials,
the West Virginia Supreme Court engaged in the familiar analysis
of the individual's right of privacy balanced against the state's four
claimed interests. In this instance, the state's interest in the pres-
ervation of life was "superior to [the prisoner's] personal privacy
(severely modified by his incarceration). ' 237 The court commented,
in dicta, on the right to refuse medical treatment. "Major decisions
about this right deal with distinctly personal issues: rights of pro-
creation and rights of death. ' 238 Although West Virginia apparently
excluded withdrawing or withholding nutrition in its statutory living
will form, 239 its preservation of existing rights clause m guarantees
the continuance of all previous rights, thus the common law principle
of self-determination is not affected. Even if the common law has
been changed by the natural death act, the state legislature could
not change the constitutional basis for assertion of the right of pri-
vacy. Unless some circumstance weighed heavily in the balance for
countervailing state interests, it would appear that termination of
artificial maintenance medical treatment, including withdrawing or
withholding nutrition and hydration, could be accomplished.
V. CONCLUSION
It hath been said, that it is not death, but dying, which is terrible. 2'
Within the last twenty years, technological advances have changed
the meaning of death and of dying. The meaning of death went
through a metamorphosis. Uniformly in the United States twenty
years ago, death meant cessation of respiration and circulation. There
was a transition period in which the legal meaning of death was
uncertain. Liability waited around the corner for the unwary medical
practitioner. Organ transplants extended lives, but the dead donors
had to be kept artificially breathing. The emergence of brain death
as an acceptable legal and medical definition and legislative action
"I Id. at 57.
23 Id.
219 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(d) (1985).
2 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(a) (1985).
24 H. FELDING, AmELIA, bk. iii, ch. 4, reprinted in TiE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
204:7 (2d ed. 1953).
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solved the medical practitioner's problem of potential liability in that
respect, but it also signaled the beginning of new and previously
unthought-of problems for individuals and the medical and legal
professions in other respects.
Dying is still metamorphosing. Today, medical technology has
pushed the boundaries of the possible beyond what most think is
probable. One of the consequences has been a form of revulsion
against what is possible. The prospect of the dying process being
extended while a machine maintains bodily functions is no longer
a future nightmare but a present possibility. The prospect of being
a breathing body with no cognitive functions fed by a tube is a
present possibility. The "right to die with dignity" movement is one
of the reactions against these possibilities, and the natural death acts
another.
It is probably rare now that a terminal patient's dying is extended
beyond what the patient or the family wishes. There is an awareness
of the possibilities for extending the dying process through medical
technology and for shortening it by the exercise of individual rights.
Problems with the person unfortunate enough to be in a persistent
vegetative state are still being resolved. Withdrawing sustenance from
him or her to allow death to occur is a developing solution, but it
is a solution with problems of its own. A fine legal line is drawn
between allowing natural death to occur by "stepping aside" and
hastening or aiding death. The line is drawn with the knowledge
that euthanasia hovers opposite "stepping aside," just across the
line.
The concurring opinion by Associate Justice Compton in Bouvia
addressed the "subtle distinction" drawn in frank terms. He believed
that Bouvia preferred death and had an absolute right to that pref-
erence.
This state and the medical profession instead of frustrating her desire, should be
attempting to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die
with ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-
starvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.22
,24 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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Bouvia should have been able to "enlist assistance from others, in-
cluding the medical profession, in making death as painless and
quick as possible." 3 This is a definite step over the line that society
is not currently willing to take, but the possibilities of the present
may pall before the possibilities of the future. The line drawn to-
morrow may be in a different position, the distinction yet more
subtle. The modern concept of dying has not yet stabilized, and a
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